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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHEILA WHERRITT 
GRAZIANO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
CHARLES BENITO GRAZIANO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 8640 
Brief of Appellant 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant intermarried at Elko, N e-
vada, on March 6, 1955. (R. 33, 43 and 44; Exh. 1) A 
daughter, Gina Graziano, was born the issue of said mar-
riage at Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 20, 1955. (R 36) 
There is no testimony as to the ages of plaintiff and de-
fendant but your author believes that it will be agreed 
that plaintiff is twenty-five years of age and that defend-
ant is twenty-four years of age at the time of the trial. 
At the time of and before said marriage plaintiff and 
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defendant were employed at Alta, Utah, the plaintiff at 
Rustler's Lodge and the defendant with ski school in-
struction and acting in a motion picture being produced 
there· and that both resided at Rustler's Lodge at Alta. 
' (R. 36) After said marriage and on or about April 1, 
1955, while defendant was still engaged in the motion 
picture work, defendant began employment as a chef and 
manager at Finn's Restaurant in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and resided at the Country Club 1Iotor Lodge. (R 36) 
Plaintiff began telling defendant that plaintiff's mother 
repeatedly told plaintiff that defendant's occupation as a 
chef was degrading. (R. 79, 80, 105 and 106) Plaintiff 
and defendant on or about 11ay 1, 1955, moved to the 
Mcl{innon home on Federal Way in Salt Lake City to 
occupy that home while the owners were away and on 
or about June 1, 1955, plaintiff and defendant moved into 
the apartment of a duplex at 2765 Wilshire Drive in Salt 
Lake City and resided there until about November 30, 
1955. (R. 102) Defendant's employment at Finn's Res-
taurant was opportuned because ~Ir. Finn Gurholt, the 
owner and regular chef and manager was incapacitated 
clue to an accident and it was understood between de-
fendant and :Mr. Gurholt that upon ~Ir. Gurholt's recov-
ery and return the employment of the defendant would 
be unneeded. Therefore, on or about October 1, 1955, the 
defendant's employment at Finn's Restaurant termi-
nated. ( R. 96, and 97) Soon thereafter defendant be-
came employed at the Alta Club in Salt Lake City as a 
buffet chef and at times serving at the bar. (R. 102) Dur-
ing defendant's employment at Alta Club plaintiff kept 
telling defendant that plaintiff's mother insisted that de-
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fendant 's employment was degrading to plaintiff and 
plaintiff's family and that some of plaintiff's mother's 
friends had mentioned to plaintiff's mother that they had 
seen and met defendant while at his buffet and bar duties 
at the Alta Club. (R. 78, 80, 105 and 106) The Alta Club 
employment was of about two weeks' duration and until 
about the 26th of October 1955. (R. 102) Defendant there-
after and about November 1, 1955, began work as a chef 
at the tea-room which Mr. Finn Gurholt operated in Mak-
off's in downtown Salt Lake City. Defendant's employ-
ment at said tea-room ceased on or about the last week of 
November 1955 because of a discontinuance of operation 
and the entire tea-room staff was laid off. (R. 97 and 102) 
During the residence of plaintiff and defendant at 
2765 Wilshire Drive in Salt Lake City, defendant fur-
nished their apartment and plaintiff's mother dictated 
the placement of furniture and generally interfered with 
plaintiff's and defendant's homemaking. (R. 80) Plain-
tiff did no cooking of meals and very little of house clean-
ing during their residence in Salt Lake City after their 
marriage. (R. 82, and 112) After plaintiff's and defend-
ant's child Gina was born at the hospital at Salt Lake City 
plaintiff and the child were taken to plaintiff's mother's 
home and remained there so long, to the embarrassment 
of the defendant, that defendant finally found it neces-
sary to insist that plaintiff and the child come and reside 
at plaintiff's and defendant's home. (R. 106) The testi-
mony of defendant, undenied by plaintiff, shows that 
plaintiff indulged in the reading of pornographic litera-
ture provided by her mother, and defendant found it 
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necessary to return such book to plaintiff's mother. (R. 
116 and 117) Defendant's testimony, undenied and cor-
roborated by plaintiff's testimony, shows that during the 
years from 1948 to 1955 plaintiff had numerous illicit 
sexual intercourse affairs with a number of men about 
which plaintiff continually told defendant. (R. 67 to 71 
inc. and 113 to 116 inc.) Plaintiff's mother had plaintiff 
will all her assets to her mother shortly after the mar-
riage. (R 73) Plaintiff eradicated the date on the mar-
riage certificate. (R. 44) Plaintiff voluntarily testified 
that the child Gina was conceived out of wedlock. (R. 44) 
Plaintiff, while living in Aspen, Colorado, left the child 
unattended. (R. 117) Plaintiff admits that she does not 
believe in God or Christ and intended not to give the child 
any Christian guidance and rearing. (R. 90, 91 and 118) 
Defendant is a lifelong member of the Catholic religious 
faith and a devout Christian. (R. 118 and 119) 
Defendant on or about December 1, 1955, contacted 
Charles Sail, who operates the Hotel Jerome at Aspen, 
Colorado, and obtained employment as a chef at said 
hotel. (R. 36 and 37) Plaintiff, defendant and their 
ehild moved to Aspen, Colorado, about December 1, 1955, 
and took residence there until about ~Iarch 1, 1956. 
(R. 37) During their stay at Aspen plaintiff's mother 
visited them there and on or about February 20th, 1956, 
plaintiff and 1 hPir child came to Salt Lake City to visit 
pbintiff's mother and family. (R. 38 and 107) On or 
about l\lnreh 1, 1956, defendant phoned plaintiff at Salt 
Lake City from Aspen and related to her that he had quit 
his job in Aspen and should they go to Connecticut and 
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plaintiff agreed to move and entrained with their child 
to Glenwood Springs, Colorado, where defendant met 
them and took them to Aspen, from whence they drove 
to Connecticut in their automobile arriving at Bristol, 
Connecticut, about March 6, 1956. (R. 38) At the time of 
and immediately after their marriage plaintiff and plain-
tiff's mother and family expressed desires that plaintiff 
and defendant move to Connecticut. (R. 72, 73, 90 and 
110) Connecticut is defendant's home state, although 
during the major portion of the seven years preceding the 
marriage defendant had lived in Utah (R. 64) Defend-
ant, plaintiff and child took residence at defendant's 
mother's house in Bristol, Connecticut. (R. 39) The house 
in Connecticut is a two-story structure with nine rooms 
on the main floor, consisting of three bedrooms, two 
kitchens, dining room, living room, bathroom and a sun 
room; and a complete apartment on the second floor. 
(R. 55 and 108) The defendant's brother and brother's 
wife and daughter occupy the second floor apartment. 
The first floor of the house is well furnished and very 
modern in all respects. (R. 55) Plaintiff testified that 
house was inadequate and she had no privacy but later 
she testified "there was nothing wrong with the house." 
(R. 55 line 29) Plaintiff testified that the people in the 
house and neighborhood in Connecticut were ''illiterate.'' 
(R. 39) On cross-examination plaintiff admits she did 
not know if they were illiterate and all she ended up with 
was that defendant's mother could not read English. 
(R. 56, 58 and 59) 
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Defendant was employed soon after arrival in Con-
necticut by his brother in a credit and collection business 
as a salesman or solicitor. (R. 39 and 40) About two 
weeks after arriving in Connecticut defendant traded his 
Ford automobile on a Porsche automobile for use in his 
work. (R. 40) Defendant's employment withhis brother 
ended after two weeks when defendant obtained employ-
ment with International Harvester Company Branch with 
good opportunities. (R. 41) Plaintiff testified that she 
was unhappy living around defendant's relations and the 
Italian and Polish neighbors and that she asked defend-
ant to find a place of their own but plaintiff agreed to wait 
until the results of defendant's draft board status was 
determined as he might be drafted and plaintiff and child 
would then have another place provided. (R. 39, 40 and 
41) Plaintiff testified that in ~\_pril1956-about a month 
after their arrival in Connecticut-she asked defendant 
to give her a divorce and defendant refused (R. 40, 41 
and 91) Plaintiff also testified that she asked defendant 
to let her go home and she was of the opinion that de-
fendant didn't care if she left but he didn't want to let 
the child go. (R. 41) During April1956 plaintiff's sister 
\Vendy Yisited plaintiff and defendant at their home in 
Connecticut and plaintiff made a three- or four-day visit 
with her said sister in Boston, ~Iassachusetts. (R. 80 and 
81) Defendant testified that plaintiff's sister \Yendy 
phoned plaintiff before leaYing for Europe and plaintiff 
told defendant her sister urged her to leaYe defendant and 
to go home; but plaintiff says that she does not remember 
this. (R. 65 and 133) About June 1956 plaintiff received 
a letter or phone eall from her mother and defendant tes-
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tifies plaintiff thereafter told defendant her mother said 
she would disown plaintiff if plaintiff didn't leave defend-
ant. (R. 107 and 134) Defendant agreed with plain-
tiff in June 1956 to sell the Porsche automobile and 
arrange for an apartment to move into and on or about 
the 12th day of July 1956 defendant traded the Porsche 
on a Studebaker car and was proceeding to arrange for 
an apartment. (R. 92 and 93) On July 17, 1956 before 
defendant left for his work in the morning he asked the 
plaintiff to bring their automobile that evening and pick 
him up at his place of work, which plaintiff agreed to do. 
(R. 60) Plaintiff failed to come to defendant's place of 
work to pick defendant up as arranged and when defend-
ant arrived home he found a note from plaintiff stating: 
"Dear Charlie : By the time you read this we will be in 
Chicago. I'm sorry to have to run away like this, but 
neither of us could stand a whole lifetime in our circum-
stances. I had to leave. Don't blame it on anybody but 
you and me. Sheila.' (Exh. 3 and R. 52) On July 17, 
1956, plaintiff took their child and baggage and went to 
IIartford, Connecticut, before noon and stayed at a board-
ing house there until plane time-about 6 p.m.-and then 
boarded a plane with their child and came to Salt Lake 
City (R. 61) After July 17, 1956, defendant found a bank 
book on a Bristol, Connecticut, bank with deposits to the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff had secretly set up or had set up for 
her the account of which she admits she received $200.00 
from her step-father in April 1956 and several smaller 
sums amounting to $60.00 deposited during the months of 
May and June, which she states came from defendant's 
earnings. (Exh. 4, R. 62 and 63) Plaintiff admits that de-
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fendant knew nothing of the~e deposits and she kept them 
secret from him. (R. 63 and 64) Plaintiff states th~t her 
stepfather sent the money for her to leave defendant and 
come home. (R. 63 and 64) Plaintiff is possessed of quite 
some financial worth represented by stocks and bonds. 
(R. 94 and 95) 
In the evening of July 17, 1956, defendant phoned 
plaintiff's mother's home in Salt Lake City and was in-
formed that plaintiff's family did not know where plain-
tiff was. (R. 110 and 111) The morning of July 18, 1956, 
defendant again phoned plaintiff's mother's home in Salt 
Lake City and talked with plaintiff there. (R. 111) In the 
conversation plaintiff informed defendant that their mar-
riage was through and for defendant to stay in Connecti-
cut and not come to Salt Lake City and if he did come 
he would not be allowed to see their child (R. 111) On 
July 26, 1956, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter in which 
plaintiff admits defendant is not at fault but that plain-
tiff is at fault and that if defendant will stay in Con-
necticut and not come and contest a divorce plaintiff will 
not ask for support money or alimony. The letter is as 
follows: 
'' ... I \Yas, still am, and always will be Yer-y 
sorry for making a tragedy in ~'"our life. You are 
n'rr good and don't deserYe it, but there "\Yas no 
other fair wa~· to end the mess we got ourselves 
iu.to. I know t hn t now yon are thii;king only of 
Guw, but ~·on don't seem to realize that it would 
be terribly bad for her ps~·rlwlog-icall~, to be shut-
tlt>d back and forth for the rest of her life .... 
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''I will start divorce proceedings as soon as 
possible and give you rights of visitation, but if 
you come out now, I'll refuse to let you see her .... 
''I don't intend to ask for any alimony or sup-
port money, so I hope you won't have much trouble 
paying off your debt .... 
''It will take nine months for the divorce to 
be final, so don't get married yet. . . . '' Exh. 2, 
R. 51 and 52) 
On or about October 1, 1956, defendant left his 
employment in Connecticut and came to Salt Lake City 
and through a mutual friend contacted the plaintiff on 
the phone and plaintiff agreed to and did visit defend-
ant at his place of abode a few days later. (R. 25 and 
119) Thereafter, plaintiff allowed a visit to defendant 
with his child on or about October 7, 1956. (R. 120) De-
fendant made attempts in this visit and others later to 
effect a reconciliation with the plaintiff. (R. 121) On or 
about the 17th day of October 1956 plaintiff brought to 
defendant a complaint and a waiver of service and 
answer and asked defendant to sign the waiver. (R. 46, 
47 and 122) Defendant agreed to look them over. (R. 122) 
At the meeting defendant asked for a few hours' visit 
with their child on October 20, 1956, the child's first birth-
day, and plaintiff agreed to allow such visit. (R. 48 and 
122) Defendant bought presents and made a cake for the 
child's birthday. On October 20, 1956, plaintiff with their 
child, came to defendant's residence and asked defendant 
if he had signed the waiver. (R. 49, 123) Defendant said 
no and called plaintiff's attention to the marriage date 
set out in the complaint, namely January 30, 1955, as 
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being incorrect. (R45, 47 and 48) The complaint also 
asked for $1.00 alimony per month. (R. 79) Defendant 
told plaintiff he would not sign the waiver and he tore 
it up. (R. 50 and 123) Plaintiff received the presents 
and cake for the child but told defendant if he would not 
sign the waiver he could not visit with the child and 
plaintiff and child left. (R. 50 and 123) 
Defendant soon after arriving at Salt Lake City in 
October 1956 obtained employment with Victor Adding 
l\1:achine Company as a salesman in and about Salt Lake 
City and was required to take a two-week training course 
at Sacramento, California, from October 23, 1956, to No-
vember 6, 1956, at which time he returned to Salt Lake 
City. Upon his return to Salt Lake City he had his attor-
ney arrange visits with his child for two and one-half 
hours one day each week and on November 7, 1956, visited 
with said child. (R. 21) On November 7, 1956, defendant 
was served with the complaint in this action which recited 
January 30, 1955, as the marriage date. (R. 1) Defendant 
was allowed the two and one-half hour '~sits on Fridays 
to and including the 23rd day of X O\ember, 1956, just 
before defendant filed his answer and counter-claim in 
this action, after which plaintiff refused defendant visita-
tion with the child. (R. 28) Thereafter plaintiff served de-
fendant "·ith an Order to Show Cause on or about the 27th 
Jay of November 1956 and it was heard December 3, 1956. 
The Uonrt ordered payment of support money, temporary 
:1limo11~· and attorney's fees and Yisitation with the child. 
(R. 11 and 14) After defendant filed his notice of appeal 
and on or about February 1, 1937, and thereafter plain-
10 
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tiff refused defendant visitation again and defendant 
thereafter filed and served an Order to Show Cause and 
upon hearing the Court found the plaintiff in contempt 
and imposed a suspended jail sentence and admonished 
her to allow defendant visitation rights as ordered in the 
decree ( R. 182 and in District Court files after this record 
came up to the Supreme Court). 
The trial was held without jury on the 22nd day of 
December 1956. On the 28th of December a Decree was 
made and on January 2, 1957 the Decree was entered, al-
lowing divorce to plaintiff, custody of child to plaintiff, 
support money, alimony for one year, attorney's fees and 
visitation rights with the child to defendant for three 
hours per week (R. 165 et seq.) 
During the trial the court and plaintiff's counsel fre-
quently interrupted the examination by defendant's coun-
sel on the pretext of saving time or that the questioning 
was to "hurt or besmirch the child." (R. 43, 44, 45, 52, 
53, 85, 87, 88, 93, 101, 141 and 142.) 
Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and to Amend the Decree, and 
also a Motion for aNew Trial. (R. 166 to 178 inc.) In De-
fendant's affidavit accompanying his Motion for a New 
Trial on the ground that he did not receive a fair and 
impartial trial he attests: 
'' ... I verily believe that I did not receive a 
fair and impartial trial in the above entitled mat-
ter on the 22nd day of December 1956 and in the 
proceedings thereto and thereafter in that at my 
11 
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t•tl d appearance at the courtroom of the above en l e 
court in compliance with the Order to Show Cause 
filed herein to be heard on the 3rd day of Decem-
ber 1956 which was set for 10 :30 a.m., I and my 
attorney' arrived at the said courtroom at 10:00 
a.m. and sat thherein until about 10:25 a.m., at 
which time Mr. Ned Warnock, plaintiff's attorney, 
came out of the Judge's Chambers, "\vhereupon I 
inquired of my attorney if the case was discussed 
by one attorney and the judge and he answered 
that it shouldn't be; and that it is apparent from 
the actions and statements of Judge Stewart Han-
sen made at the said Order to Show Cause hear-
ing and at the trial that the matter was pre-tried 
and pre-judged out of the presence of myself and 
my attorney because the said Judge's statements 
would not have been within his knowledge but for 
discussions thereon between himself and the attor-
ney for plaintiff and this contention is borne out 
by rulings showing in the record excluding evi-
dence my attorney attempted to produce and also 
by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree filed in the above entitled matter on 
the 2nd day of January 1957 when compared with 
the evidence in the record as produced at the trial; 
and that said Xed \Y arnock is a brother of the 
stepfather or adopting father of said plaintiff and 
he has been oYerzealous in his personal interest 
in the rna tter as is shown bY his actions in the 
courtroom and as is shown in the other accom-
panying affidaYits attached hereto: and that the 
court refn::-wd counsel for mYself to admit evi-
dencP surrounding the marriage a11d immediately 
tlH'n'<lfter after the plaintif£'8 attorney opened up 
the matter and particularly near the conclusion of 
the trial ns will show in the reporter ·s record; 
and that the court stated that it did not want or 
need any summation argu1nent at the conclusion 
of presenting of eYidenre and m~T attorney was 
12 
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refused an opportunity to make a summation argu-
ment; and that as soon as the defense attorney 
stated that he had no further questions the Judge 
immediately collected his papers and the plain-
tiff's attorney had his brief case closed and was at 
the cloak rack for his overcoat when my attorney 
inquired of the Judge about summation argument, 
all of which indicated that it was prearranged and 
that all during the trial the Judge and plaintiff's 
counsel were continually urging speeding up of 
the trial by my attorney, all of which indicated 
that everything was predetermined anyway ; and 
that the actions and statements of the said Ned 
Warnock as shown in the accompanying affidavits 
bears out my contention that the matter was pre-
tried and pre-judged and that I did not receive a 
fair and impartial trial.'' 
The affidavit of :Mr. Finn Z. Gurholt is as follows: 
"I, Finn Gurholt, after first being sworn 
upon oath depose and say, That on the 22nd day 
of December 1956, I attended and heard the trial 
and testified as a witness at the trial in the divorce 
matter between Sheila Wherritt Graziano and 
Charles Benito Graziano before Judge Stewart 
Hansen at the Salt Lake County Court House in 
Salt Lake City, Utah; that thereafter and in the 
evening of the said 22nd day of December 1956, I 
and my wife were invited and attended a party as 
guests of Mr. and Mrs. Lester Blackner, at the 
home of .Mr. and Mrs. Ben Lingenfelter, parents of 
Mr. Blackner, at 526 East 13th Avenue in Salt 
Lake City, Utah; that also as a guest at the said 
party was Mr. Ned Warnock, who is the attorney 
for the said Sheila Wherritt Graziano; that at 
said party at the start thereof, Mr. Warnock, 
aforesaid, and myself and my wife were congenial 
and as the party progressed and Mr. Warnock 
13 
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became more intoxicated he became loquacious 
and he directed his remarks to the group of guests 
in general and stated in .words an~ substance, 
'That son of a bitch Graziano, meaning Charles 
Graziano that dirty bastard, we will fix him''; 
that I th~n interjected, saying, 'Will you repeat 
that Mr. Warnock'; that then Mr. Lester Black-
ner stepped in asking me not to engage in argu-
ment· that then said Mr. Ned Warnock then 
' shouted to me and my wife, 'You both get out of 
here Mr. Gurholt. You had better leave right 
now'; that I and my wife had on our coats and I 
stated to Mr. Warnock in the hearing of the host, 
~Ir. Blackner, 'Yes, in deference to our host or 
otherwise you might get hurt badly"; that Mr. 
Blackner tried to excuse the actions of ~Ir. Ned 
Warnock and expressed his regrets thereof; that 
I and my wife then left the party.' 
The affidavit of J o Anne Fallen tine is as follows: 
"I, Joann Fallen tine, after first being dnly 
sworn upon oath, depose and say: That on the 
28th day of December 1956, at the Balsam Inn at 
Brighton, rtah, ~Ir. Tom Warnock, son of ~Ir. 
Ned \V arnock, "~ho is the attorney for the plain-
tiff in an action between Sheila Wherritt Graziano 
and Charles Benito Graziano for divorce, engaged 
me in conversation in the presence of :Jirs. Boyd 
Summerha~·s: that said Tom \Yarnock stated that 
'rrhe Judge called my dad and thanked him for 
being so patic·nt with the defense·; that said Tom 
vVarnock also rdated that ·~Ir. Graziano was not 
going to rect•in" visitation rights, was to pay ali-
moll~·, support money and lawyer ·s fees'; that said 
Tom \Varnock also stated • .Jir. Christensen, at-
tonw~T for l\lr. Graziano, didn't maintain an office 
and he had !10t been in practice of late'; that said 
~r r. Tom \\ arnock made many other derogatory 
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statements about Mr. Graziano and his attorney, 
Mr. Christensen.'' 
The only denials of the statements in the affidavits 
were not under oath and were made by Judge Hansen 
and Mr. Ned Warnock at the hearing of the defendant's 
:Motion for a New Trial, and these denials were directed 
to the charges that the matter was discussed in chambers 
and that it was pre-determined. (R. 152 to 157 inc.) De-
fense counsel called the attention of the court at the hear-
ing to the Rules of Procedure that counter-affidavits filed 
within ten days are the proper procedure in matters of 
this type. (R. 158) The Rules of Civil Procedure of Utah 
covering the matter is Rule 59 (c) and opposing affidavits 
are therein provided for. The Court questioned that he 
needed to make affidavit and proceeded to have his state-
ments read into the record not under oath. (R. 152 to 157 
inc.) The court allowed Mr. Warnock to read into the 
record his statements not under oath. Mr. Warnock stated 
he wouldn't file any affidavits. (R. 158) Defense counsel 
called the court's attention to the fact that the rules were 
made for just such cases as this. (R. 152) After the hear-
ing on the Motions to Amend and Motion for a New Trial 
the court on January 22nd, 1957, denied all of the Motions. 
Thereafter and on January 23rd, 1957, an Amended De-
cree was filed which contained the same provisions as the 
former Decree. Thereafter defendant proceeded with his 
appeal to the Supreme Court. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED, FOR THE REASONS: 
(A) THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFI-
CIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS THAT 
PLAINTIFF SHOWED GROUNDS FOR DI-
VORCE BUT ON THE CONTRARY THE 
EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE, AND 
(B) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
WILL BE SERVED BY PLACEMENT OTHER 
THAN WITH PLAINTIFF. 
2. APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASONS: 
(A) THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE ARE NOT 
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND 
(B) THAT APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. 
3. THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO AL-
LOW APPELLANT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE RELAT-
ING TO: 
(A) WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S MOTHER MADE 
STATEMENTS TO PLAINTIFF DEGRADING 
DEFENDANT IN HIS OCCUPATION, AND 
(B) APPELLANT'S EXPLANATION OF HIS AN-
SWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S QUES-
TION AS TO HIS REASON FOR HIS MARRIAGE 
AS AN HONORABLE AND PROPER ACT 
UNDER HIS CHRISTIAN AND MORAL CODE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED, FOR THE REASONS: 
(A) THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFI-
CIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS THAT 
PLAINTIFF SHOWED GROUNDS FOR DI-
VORCE BUT ON THE CONTRARY THE 
EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE, AND 
(B) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
WILL BE SERVED BY PLACEMENT OTHER 
THAN WITH PLAINTIFF. 
The attempt of the plaintiff to show grounds for di-
vorce may be separated into the following: 
(a) That defendant quit his jobs, 
(b) That the house defendant furnished for his fam-
ily in Connecticut was inadequate and had no privacy, 
(c) That defendant's relatives and neighbors in Con-
necticut were not sociable, 
(d) That defendant's mother was illiterate, and 
likewise as to his other relatives, and 
(e) That in Connecticut plaintiff had no social and 
recreational activity and was unhappy. 
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It is to be noted that defendant's jobs in Salt Lake 
City were not a matter of terminating because of volun-
tary quitting or being discharged. In the case of the em-
ployment as a chef at Finn's restaurant the termination 
was due to Mr. Gurholt 's returning to his post after re-
covering from an injury. (R. 96 and 97) In the case of 
the employment at Alta Club it was a temporary employ-
ment at its inception. Further it is noted in connection 
With this employment that plaintiff particularly stressed 
to defendant that she and her mother's family were em-
barrassed by friends of theirs mentioning meeting and 
seeing defendant at this position. So no doubt the plain-
tiff could be charged with desiring the termination of 
this employment. (R 97) In the case of employment at 
~\lakoff's Tea Room the termination was a matter of dis-
continued operation and the entire staff was laid off. 
(H. 97) 
There is no contention on the plaintiff's part that de-
fendant failed in any respect to provide for plaintiff or 
their child. It is to be noted that during all of defendant's 
employments at Salt Lake City plaintiff continually told 
defendant that her mother kept telling her that defend-
ant's occupation as a chef was degrading. (R. 79, 80, 105 
and 106). It is to be noted that the defendant was very 
highly thought of by his employer and that he performed 
('X<'ellenily at his trade (H. 97). Finally under cross-ex-
amination plaintiff finally stated that she did not com-
plnin about anywhere except in Connecticut. (R. 84) So 
dnring the trial when her contention about the changing 
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of jobs lost their merit she abandoned it and pointed 
thoughts only in Connecticut. 
The evidence shows throughout that defendant kept 
himself fully employed and provided for his wife and 
child. When one of his employments ceased he imme-
diately obtained other employment. The continual inter-
ference and derogation concerning defendant's occupa-
tion by plaintiff's mother's statements to plaintiff and 
relayed to defendant caused defendant to move from Salt 
Lake City to Aspen, Colorado, where he had pre-arranged 
employment at the Jerome Hotel as a chef. (R. 36 and 
37) Defendant kept fully employed in Connecticut and 
as plaintiff admitted in her testimony defendant's em-
ployment with the International Harvester Company 
offered good opportunities. (R. 41) It is to be noted that 
it was this employment in which defendant was engaged 
when plaintiff took the child and abandoned the defend-
ant and came to her mother's home in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (R. 61) It was from this employment that defend-
ant was forced to leave to come to Salt Lake City in 
October 1956 to protect his family rights and his obliga-
tions to his child. Defendant immediately after arriving 
in Salt Lake City obtained employment as a salesman. 
(R. 21 and 25) It is submitted that plaintiff's attempt 
to show lack of industry or irresponsibility on defend-
ant's part by job changes is without merit and much can 
be assigned to plaintiff's and plaintiff's mother's attitude 
toward defendant and his occupation. It is interesting 
to note that plaintiff did little if anything to encourage or 
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help as a wife who is trying to make a success of a mar-
riage does. 
Plaintiff testifies that the house in which plaintiff, 
defendant and their child took residence upon arrival in 
Connecticut, which belongs to defendant's mother, was 
inadequate and she could have no privacy and it was all 
centered in the kitchen. (R. 39) Under cross-examination 
of plaintiff and testimony of defendant it is shown that 
the house is a fine nine-room, very modern first floor 
compartment of a two-story house with two kitchens, 
three bedrooms, living room, dining room, bathroom and 
sun room in the first floor compartment. The first floor 
compartment was very adequate for the residence of 
(lefendant 's mother and the defendant and his family and 
the plaintiff had ample provision for privacy. (R. 55 and 
108) Plaintiff under cross-examination finally admitted 
"there is nothing wrong with the house." (R. 55, line 29) 
It is submitted that plaintiff shows that her effort to sus-
tain a ground of divorce on such a contention as the inade-
quacy of the> house is entirely frivolous. 
\ Vhen plaintiff's point as to the house did not hold 
up she reverted to defendant's relatives and neighbors 
in Connecticut; and particularly stated that defendant's 
mother "·a~ illiterate. (R. 39) After much cross-examina-
tion plaintiff admitted that her accusation that defend-
ant's mother was illiterate was wrong and that her com-
plaint wns that plaintiff meant ignorant but upon further 
examination it was shown that plaintiff's only complaint 
was that defendant's mother could not speak English or 
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only broken English but that after a short while she 
could understand the mother. Plaintiff admitted that after 
being there for a while and talking with defendant's 
mother she had no trouble understanding her. (R. 56, 57) 
Plaintiff also admitted that defendant's brother and his 
wife who lived in the second-story apartment of the house 
were not illiterate and were all right, as well as the neigh-
bors. (R. 58) It is to be noted that defendant's mother 
worked days and at the same time defendant worked and 
that plaintiff had her time and place for the most part to 
herself during the daytime and there were two kitchens. 
Certainly the defendant's mother did not bother or inter-
fere with the activity of the plaintiff about the home and 
nowhere does the plaintiff so contend. It is submitted that 
plaintiff retracted all of her contentions relative to the 
personal attacks on defendant's family members. This is 
corroborated in the note left by plaintiff when she aban-
done dthe defendant, to wit: 'Don't blame anybody but 
you and me.' (Exh. 3) These frivolous and irrevelant 
contentions of plaintiff are tacit admissions of the fact 
that she was in dire want of some evidence to sustain 
her alleged ground for divorce. 
Soon after arriving in Connecticut plaintiff asked 
defendant to get an apartment elsewhere than in his 
mother's house but upon knowing of the likelihood of 
defendant being drafted into the army she agreed to await 
the results from the draft board. (R. 39 and 40) Plaintiff 
attempted to show that defendant provided no social or 
recreational life for plaintiff during the marriage. How-
ever, further examination shows that defendant took her 
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to plays, theatres, socials, swimming, tennis and other ac-
tivities very often during the time in Connecticut. (R. 
113) Plaintiff stated that she was only complaining about 
the social activity and recreational activity in Connecti-
cut. (R 84) It is interesting to note that plaintiff received 
more of such activities while in Connecticut than when in 
Aspen, Colorado, or Salt Lake City, but she insists on 
narrowing it to Connecticut. It is to be noted that plain-
tiff urged the acquisition of another apartment and com-
plained of lack of activity and at the same time plaintiff 
was secretly each week during the months of May and 
June depositing parts of defendant's earning in her pri-
vate bank account to supplement the $200.00 her father 
sent to her to leave defendant in April. 
Plaintiff stated that she lost twenty pounds during 
her entire period of marriage to defendant. (R. 42) It is 
not contended that plaintiff "-as made ill from weight loss 
and that it did not effect her health for she admits much 
physical activity in tennis, swimming and other activities 
in Connecticut and also in Salt Lake City after she aban-
doned defendant. (R. 83 to 89 inc. and 113, 136 and 137) 
Plaintiff would haYe it implied that her weight loss and 
sadness was due to defendant, where as a matter of fact 
the evidence shows it was due to her being constantly 
harassed by her mother, sister and stepfather urging her 
and conspiring with her to leave defendant. (R. 61, 63, 64, 
79, 80, 105, 106, 133 and 134) Defendant ·s undenied testi-
mony is that plaintiff was usually sad whenever she re-
ceived phone or letter messages from her family members. 
(H. 1:~:J and 133) It is not strange that her conscience 
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bothered her when she knew, as she expressed in her let-
ter, that defendant was 'good and did not deserve it' and 
she was at the same time secretly preparing to abandon 
and hurt the defendant that she was under a strained sad-
ness of her own making, coupled with conspiracy with 
her father, mother and sister. It is submitted that plain-
tiff may have made a better and more conscientious effort 
to fulfill her marital contract and obligations to her hus-
band and child but for the constant urging and inter-
ference from her mother, sister and stepfather to leave 
defendant and cause a separation. It is also submitted 
that this contention of no social and recreational life is 
without merit under the evidence. 
It is to be noted that plaintiff not only produced no 
evidence to sustain a ground of divorce while on the wit-
ness stand but that she tacitly admits that she had no 
ground for divorce in the following ways: (1) Plaintiff 
asked defendant to give her a divorce soon after arriving 
in Connecticut (R. 40, 41 and 91), (2) plaintiff threatened 
that if defendant left Connecticut and came to Salt Lake 
City he could not see their child (R. 51, Exh. 2), (3) plain-
tiff tried by quasi bribe to keep defendant in Connecticut 
by writing that if he stayed there and did not resist her 
divorce action she would not ask for suport money and 
alimony (Exh. 2), ( 4) plaintiff used courting favor and 
pressure methods alternately in refusing defendant visi-
tation rights with their child-favors before defendant 
moved in the procedures of this action, spite and pressure 
after he made procedural moves-(R. 28), (5) plaintiff 
used pressure methods on defendant on the child's birth-
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day to force defendant to sign a waiver of service and 
answer ( R. 49 and 123), and ( 6) plaintiff testified she 
wanted a 'nice easy divorce' (R. 49, lines 17 and 18). 
In desperation of failure to make a showing of some 
evidence of ground for divorce plaintiff's counsel using 
a leading question, "Did defendant tell you he no longer 
loved you~'' to which plaintiff answered 'Yes.' (R. 41) 
The defendant emphatically denied this in his testimony. 
(R 138) Defendant's attempt at reconciliation after com~ 
ing to Salt Lake City in October 1956 certainly shows 
that the plaintiff's affirmative answer is unreliable. (R. 
35 and 121) It is the old story in divorce cases that if 
you haven't any ground just testify that your spouse said 
he no longer loves you. 
Both the judge and plaintiff's counsel became ob--
sessed with the thought that defendant was "trying to 
besmirch or hurt the child.'' It is submitted that plain-
tiff's counsel started this and impressed it upon the 
judge because that is the Yery- phraseology and main 
contention that plaintiff's attorneys used in taking the 
defendant's deposition in this matter and it is the same 
phraseology the judge used in making remarks from the 
bench at the beginning of the hearing on plaintiff's Order 
to Show Cause on December 3, 1956, after being in cham-
bers with plaintiff's counsel for about one-half hour 
lwl'orc the hearing as is stated in defendant's affidavit 
<H'eompanyiJJg' his :\Lotion for a X ew Trial, and the same 
Htatements of the judge from the bench at the com-
m('IW<'m<•nt of the trial, as well as the repeated use there-
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of during the trial. (R. 154, 174, 175 and 186) It is to be 
noted that the judge made the remarks at the beginning 
of the hearing on the Order to Show Cause before he had 
any access to the deposition and that adds weight to the 
contention that the judge and plaintiff's counsel dis-
cussed it in chambers before the hearing. 
Let us examine this and see what occurred. To begin, 
the plaintiff insisted on alleging in her complaint an 
untruth as to the date of marriage. Defendant admon-
ished her about it when she. had it in the complaint she 
gave him accompanied with the waiver. Plaintiff and 
her counsel became incensed when defendant stated the 
correct date of marriage in his answer and counter-
claim and made the obsessed idea of defendant 'hurting 
the child' in the defendant's deposition. Plaintiff in her 
testimony stated that the child was conceived out of 
wedlock and to defendant's counsel's question, "Who 
said the child was conceived out of wedlock~" plaintiff 
answered "I did." (R. 44) Also plaintiff was advised by 
defendant's counsel that many children are born within 
seven months of conception as was this child but plain-
tiff insisted on her answer. And at this point the court 
and plaintiff's counsel came vehemently forth with the 
hue and cry" Trying to hurt the child." An examination 
of defendant's deposition will show that defendant and 
defendant's counsel made a vigorous argument against 
any implication that the child was conceived out of wed-
lock and argued strenuously to the contrary. (R. 186) 
Plaintiff admits she eradicated the date on the marriage 
certificate. (R. 43) Now it is submitted that no persons 
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of plaintiff's and defendant's names were married in 
Elko, Nevada, on January 30, 1955, and the record would 
so show. Therefore, if a divorce had been granted under 
plaintiff's complaint it would have been of no force or 
effect. It is further submitted that if plaintiff had alleged 
the true date of marriage, defendant in his answer would 
have admitted it and the issue of date of marriage and 
implication of conception out of wedlock would never 
have entered the picture. Certainly any blame for the 
implication or the hurt or besmirch - real or fancied -
is at the instance of the plaintiff. Especially so after 
defendant had called it to plaintiff's attention when she 
handed him a complaint and waiver on October 20, 1956 
(R. 48) It is submitted that plaintiff and plaintiff's 
mother showed some false sense of shame in this matter 
in urging plaintiff and defendant to go to Connecticut 
soon after the marriage, eradication of date on marriage 
certificate, announcement of a false date of marriage, 
and insistance on alleging an untruth as to the marriage 
date in the complaint. 
The judge's statement on two occasions of interrup-
tion to rush the matter and saYe time was that all he was 
interested in was that she was unhappy in Connecticut. 
(R. 59, lines 22 to 30 inc. and 60, line 1) Of course, many 
people are unhappy under certain circumstances and for 
periods of time. I submit that is no reason or ground for 
divorce - especially where the husband was doing his 
level best to make things pleasanter and especially where 
plaintiff had already decided she did not want the mar-
riage and wanted a divorce. Most wives with any degree 
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of desire for making a marriage a success or any sense 
of mutual responsibility with their spouse will try to help 
and encourage in the rough times of the venture. It is 
submitted that plaintiff did not take her marriage se-
riously and was discouraged from the start from so doing 
by her parents. It is not a question of whether the plain-
tiff was unhappy of itself, it is a question of whether 
defendant caused the unhappiness, if it really existed, or 
whether he was responsibile for any real or fancied un-
happiness. It is submitted that defendant, laboring 
against heavy odds from the plaintiff and her family did 
his level best to properly provide and care for his wife 
and child and did so, and that the plaintiff's unhappiness, 
if any really existed, was entirely of her and her family's 
making. 
Did plaintiff and plaintiff's family really believe 
that defendant's sense of family responsibility and love 
of wife and child was so shallow that mere money- not 
ask for alimony and support - threat of no child visita-
tion and spiteful and resentful treatment of visitation 
with child would dissuade defendant from facing up to 
the situation and meeting the issues in a forthrightly 
manner? How mistaken they were ! 
Even after the appeal was filed they refused visita-
tion and forced defendant to cite plaintiff for contempt 
and she was given a suspended sentence in order for de-
fendant to gain his right of visitation. 
Therefore, it is submitted that plaintiff certainly 
proved no ground for divorce against defendant and she 
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should have been denied the divorce and that the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereon are not in 
conformity with the evidence. 
Now let us examine the evidence to determine 
whether the defendant showed ground for divorce under 
his counterclaim. The evidence shows the following 
facts : the plaintiff joined her mother and sister in con-
tinually telling defendant his occupation was degrading, 
the plaintiff joined her mother in directing the type and 
placement of plaintiff's and defendant's home furnish-
ings to the embarrassment of the defendant, the plain-
tiff aided and abetted the harassment of defendant by 
indulging in reading pronographic books and literature 
until in one instance defendant found it necessary to 
take the book back to plaintiff's mother who furnished 
it to plaintiff, the plaintiff and plaintiff's mother resisted 
defendant in taking plaintiff and their baby from the 
hospital to plaintiff's mother's home and defendant found 
it necessary after some time to insist that his wife and 
child come to their home, the plaintiff insisted in relating 
her unchaste and illicit sexual affairs with her men 
acquaintances during several years before their marriage, 
and also mal\:ing comparisons. The plaintiff does not 
deny any of her self-described illicit sexual affairs with 
named men. In plaintiff's cross-examination she defi-
nitely admits the persons, places and times as a founda-
tion for defendant's testimony as to her sex relations 
with these persons. Plaintiff in no instance denies any 
of the defendant's testimony of her self-related affairs of 
unchastity and immoral background. Plaintiff in her own 
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testimony states that she does not believe in God or Christ 
and does not intend that her and defendant's child be 
given religious guidance and rearing. Defendant testifies 
that he is a lifelong member of the Catholic religious 
faith and a devout Christian. Defendant's concern and 
love for his child is shown throughout the entire case in 
the following instances : 
(a) Plaintiff testifies it is her belief defendant did 
not care if she left, but he did not want the child to go 
and this expressed in her letter to defendant (Exhibit 2), 
(b) plaintiff used child visitation to court favor of and 
pressure on defendant because plaintiff knew defendant's 
keen concern and love for their child and (c) defendant's 
continuous insistence on visitation rights with their child 
in spite of all of plaintiff's resistant efforts to dissuade 
defendant. The plaintiff and her stepfather conspired to 
cause plaintiff to leave and abandon defendant by pro-
viding funds secretly, by encouraging plaintiff to leave 
defendant and separate from him, and by poisoning the 
plaintiff's mind with degrading statements about defend-
ant and his occupation. The defendant was industrious, 
always fully employed, of good and conscientious repu-
tation (R. 97), loves children and children love him (R. 
97), had and has a deep sense of family responsibility and 
was and is particularly concerned about his own and 
plaintiff's rhild 's welfare. 
The plaintiff makes no contention that defendant did 
not properly provide for his wife and child. In fact, he 
did so and in the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause hearing 
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defendant states he was and is desirous of supporting 
their child (R. 19). 
It is submitted that defendant has faced the issues 
fairly and straightforwardly and he is justifiably con-
cerned about the environment under which their child is 
to be raised. It is his conviction - as is shown by re-
flecting on the whole of the evidence and proceedings 
herein- that his child be not influenced by the environ-
ment of pornographic attitudes, lack of Christian belief 
and understanding and unchaste habits, the very same 
environment under which the plaintiff was raised and 
which may result in the child developing as the plaintiff 
has. It is likely to be asked why then did defendant try 
to reconcile with plaintiff after returning to Salt Lake 
City in October 1956. The defendant is convinced that the 
environment of himself and plaintiff is vastly different 
from that of plaintiff, plaintiff~s mother and stepfather, 
and that the influence he would be able to exert on plain-
tiff away from her folk's influence and his influencB upon 
their child when constantly and daily being with plaintiff 
and the child would eliminate the undesirable traits of 
plaintiff. These influences of defendant cannot be effected 
by infrequent and short visitation periods under the pres-
ent decree order. It is very apparent that under the pres-
ent situation of no conciliation attitude of plaintiff which 
exists that it becomes the defendant's duty to urge some 
environment and custody in himself or his mother or some 
desirable custody other than plaintiff and her mother's 
family. Defendant has requested the custody and has 
shown that he is ready, willing and able to assume the 
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responsibility (R. 137 and 138) Defendant has agreed 
to provide a home and care in Salt Lake City or else-
where with visitation rights to plaintiff. 
The evidence also shows that plaintiff abandoned the 
support of the defendant and that in Aspen, Colorado, 
plaintiff failed to give proper attention to their child by 
leaving her alone for periods of time. (R. 117) 
The history of plaintiff's behavior is that of a girl 
who had access to means for a college education and 
foreign travel as well as quite some financial worth, and 
that of a moral misbehavior with boy friends at college 
and in European countries. The foundation for the re-
lation by the plaintiff of moral misbehavior is laid in 
plaintiff's testimony on cross-examination and the relat-
ing of the specific instances in detail is produced in de-
fendant's testimony, all of which is undenied by plaintiff 
and in fact bolstered by lain tiff's counsel's question that 
plaintiff related these facts to defendant before mar-
riage. ( R. 67 to 71 inc. and 113 to 117 inc.) Also the 
undenied testimony of defendant as to the type of porno-
graphic books owned by plaintiff's mother and read by 
plaintiff and defendant's taking a book from plaintiff 
and returning it to plaintiff's mother. This pattern of 
misbehavior of plaintiff ran true to form right into de-
fendant's acquaintance and plaintiff very well summed 
it up in her written statement, "I was, still am, and 
always will be very sorry for making a tragedy in your 
life. You are very good and don't deserve it, but there 
was no other way to end the mess we got ourselves into. 
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... I know now that you are thinking only of Gina. · .. " 
(Exh. 2) The foregoing is an extract from a letter from 
plaintiff to defendant dated July 26, 1956, after she had 
taken their child and run away from defendant. The 
reputation and forthrightness of the defendant is testified 
to by his employer in Salt Lake City when he was and 
after he was first married. Thte defendant's actions in 
doing the honorable and right thing toward the plaintiff, 
his keeping fully employed and providing for his family 
in the face of resistence from plaintiff's mother and 
family, his deep concern for his child and his continued 
efforts for the child's best interests attest to his goodness 
and corroborated his wife's statement, "You are very 
good and don't deserve it"-meaning the way plaintiff 
and her family had treated defendant. The evidence 
shows that the defendant is a God-fearing Christian 
and has had fine Christian upbringing. The plaintiff her-
self testifies that she does not believe in God or Christ 
and Christianity. The plaintiff herself testifies that she 
does not intend to nor will she give their child any ortho-
dox Christian upbringing or guidance. 
The evidence shows that immediately following plain. 
tiff's and defendant's marriage plaintiff and her mother 
desired that plaintiff and defendant go from Salt Lake 
City to Connecticut, that plaintiff related to defendant re-
peated statements assigned to plaintiff's mother that the 
occupaion of defendant as a chef and such were degrad-
ing; that plaintiff's mother officiously prevailed upon 
plaintiff to will all of her propPrty and possessions to 
plaintiff's mother; that plaintiff's mother officiously di-
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rected the type and placement of plaintiff's and defend-
ant's home furnishings; that plaintiff's mother moved 
plaintiff and said child from the hospital to plaintiff's 
mother's home and stayed there so long that defendant 
found it necessary to demand that plaintiff and their 
child come home; that plaintiff's mother and stepfather 
held out inducements to plaintiff to come home at their 
expense after plaintiff and defendant moved to Aspen; 
and that plaintiff's mother and stepfather secretly and 
about a month after plaintiff and defendant arrived in 
Connecticut sent funds for plaintiff to leave and aban-
don defendant. The plaintiff's sister and mother pleaded 
and coerced plaintiff into running away from defendant 
and take their child with her. 
Early in her Connecticut residence plaintiff wanted a 
divorce. Early in that period her stepfather sent $200.00 
to her to leave defendant. Just before going to Connecti-
cut plaintiff was visiting from Aspen, Colorado, at her 
mother's home in Salt Lake City and quite likely there 
was planted the idae ofseparation and plaintiff quite 
likely went to Connecticut so she could leave defendant 
and return to Salt Lake City where defendant would 
be far away and less likely to come so far to contest a 
diorce action in the event he refused to give her a re-
quested divorce. When defendant refused to give her a 
divorce she had the groundwork laid for her abandon-
ment. That she made a strenuous effort to get defend-
ant and keep him at a distant place is evidenced by the 
contents of her letter using refusal of visiting child as 
a t,hreat and to not ask for support and alimony as 
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inducement for defendant to stay away and not contest 
her contemplated divorce action. Plaintiff's attitude to-
ward the solemnity of her marriage is shown in her state-
ment that she wanted a "nice easy divorce." 
Defendant has continuously and repeatedly shown 
that his primary concern is to his family and particularly 
to their child. Defendant has continuously and justifiably 
shown his concern about the lack of moral upbringing 
and activities of the plaintiff and the lack of God-fearing 
Christian belief of plaintiff as it will affect their child's 
lifei if the child is raised under the influence that the 
plaintiff was raised under. The very results of the plain-
tiff's life is a living example of the likely results of 
their child's life under those environmental cir-
cumstances. 
Regardless of what may be the final decision in this 
matter relative to the child's future rearing in particular, 
and whether or not defendant's grounds for divorce is 
determined to be well taken and that plaintiff failed to 
sustain any ground for divorce, the defendant will be able 
to face the future knowing full well that, in spite of all the 
numerous acts of resistance by plaintiff and her family, 
he has in all his actions including these court actions done 
all he could to effect what is for best interests of their 
child and maintain his responsibilities thereunder as he 
sees it and he can go forward with a clear conscience 
knowing that no future events as to the child's life can 
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In Wilson v. vVilson, 124 Cal. App. 655; 13 P. 2d 376, 
the court held: Award of custody of two minor children to 
husband granted divorce for wife's adultery, with pro-
visions permitting wife to visit children at reasonable 
times, was for the best interests of the children and fair 
to spouses. 
In Larsen v. Larsen, 134 Kans. 436; 7 P. 2d. 120, the 
Court held: Where husband obtained divorce for wife's 
misconduct, custody of minor children were properly 
granted to husband's mother rather than to wife. 
In Barnett v. Barnett, 158 Okla. 270; 13 P. 2d 104, the 
court held: In wife's action for divorce wherein husband 
filed cross petition, awarding custody of children to father 
who obtained divorce was proper under the evidence. 
The case of Holmanv. Holma,n, 94 Utah 300; 77 P. 2d. 
329, is applicable in many respects to the case at bar and 
the reasoning therein is interesting to this case. In the 
Holman case there was no question of immoral back-
ground or lack of Christian beliefs and rearing as in this 
case. Hqwever, the court pointed out that provision for 
custody of the child for a portion of the year to the father 
should be provided. 
Therefore, it is submitted that plaintiff failed to prove 
any ground for divorce; that defendant proved more than 
sufficient grounds for divorce under his counterclaim 
and that defendant should have been and should be 
awarded a divorce; that the best interests of the child 
will be served by awarding the custody of the child to the 
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defendant as he proposes in his testimony or at least to 
remove the child from the environmental influence of the 
plaintiff and plaintiff's family as it now exists. 
POINT 2 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASONS: 
(A) THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE ARE NOT 
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND 
(B) THAT APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. 
The argument set forth under Point 1 above fully 
covers the (A) part of Point 2 and is made a part hereof 
by reference. 
As to part (B) of Point 2, the affidavits of the defend-
ant, Mr. Finn Gurholt and ~Iiss Joann Fallentine are 
set out in the Statement of Facts herein (Supra, pp. 11-15) 
and support the contention of the defendant that the 
judge and counsel for plaintiff discussed the case before 
the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause hearing and that the 
judge manifested by his statements, actions and attitudes 
during the trial that he had pre-judged and pre-deter-
mined the matter. (R. 153) Let us analyze what occurred. 
Defendant and his counsel arriYed at the court room at 
10:00 a.m. the day of the Order to Show Cause hearing 
and sat therein until about 10 :~5 a. m., at which time 
the plaintiff's counsel eame out of the judge's chambers. 
Defendant made the inquiry of his counsel ,vhether the 
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case was discussed by counsel for the plaintiff with the 
judge. Court convened at 10 :30 a.m. and the judge made 
comments from the bench relative to "besmirching the 
child" and other remarks about the case that he could not 
have known but for a discussion with plaintiff's counsel. 
Both the judge and plaintiff's counsel became obsessed 
with the thought that defendant was ''trying to besmirch 
or hurt the child.'' It is submitted that plaintiff's counsel 
started this and impressed it upon the judge because that 
is the very phraseology and main contention that plain-
tiff's attorneys used in taking the defendant's deposition 
in this matter and it is the same phraseology the judge 
used in making remarks from the bench at the beginning 
of the hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause on De-
cember 3, 1956, after being in chambers with plaintiff's 
counsel for about one-half hour before the hearing as is 
stated in defendant's affidavit accompanying his J\.tiotion 
For a New Trial, and the same statement of the judge 
from the bench at the commencement of the trial, as well 
as the repeated use thereof during the trial. (R. 154, 174, 
175 and 186) It is to be noted that the judge made the 
remarks at the beginning of the hearing on the Order to 
Show Cause before he had any access to the deposition 
and that adds weight to the contention that the judge 
and plaintiff's counsel discussed it in chambers before 
the hearing. Plaintiff's counsel must have impressed the 
judge with the thought "hurt or besmirch the child" at a 
discussion, otherwise it is hard to conceive why the judge 
was always so alert and overzealous to concern himself 
time after time throughout the trial, in many instances 
without plaintiff's counsel's intervention, and be joined 
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by the plaintiff's counsel in the hue and cry. Especially 
so when every act in the case that might cause a reflee-
tion on the child was initiated by the plaintiff. It is in-
teresting to note that at no time and no place did the 
defendant in this matter bring the child into the picture 
with relation to the feature of conception out of wed-
lock. A perusal of the defendant's deposition will reveal 
that defendant and his counsel strenuously objected to 
any implication that the child was conceived out of wed-
lock. (R. 186) Time after time defendant's counsel in-
formed the court that the testimony trying to be adduced 
had nothing to do with the child. (R. 44, 142 and 155) 
During the trial the court and plaintiff's counsel 
continuoually tried to rush the matter by statements of 
saving time as follows : 
Lines 24 and 25, page 45 of the Record: ''Let's 
see what he has got in mind, JJ r. Warnock, and 
save time." (Italics writer's) Record, p. 52, line 
30: "Mr. Warnock: I am just trying to save time 
here." Record, p. 53, Lines 1, 2, 3 and 4: "Mr. 
Christensen: We have plenty of time. This case is 
contested, and I don't think that I am going to 
prejudice the interests of my client by rushing for 
the benefit of opposing counsel, your Honor." 
Record, p. 85, lines 28, 29 and 30, and p. 86, 
lines 1 to 8 inc. : 
''The Court : We can go on all day with this, 
Mr. Christensen. 
"Mr. Warnock: We ca11 go on all week. 
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''The Court : No. I can't just see any point 
in it. 
"Mr. Warnock: I object. 
''The Court : The only place she has com-
plained about is Bristol. 
''Mr. Christensen: I want to show she could 
have friends, like she had tried in these other 
places. 
''The Court: Go ahead to save time, if you 
think it is important.'' 
(This is a good example of the court wanting to try 
the defendant's case as counsel for defendant. The atti-
tudes of let's get it over, I've got it determined anyway, 
prevails all along.) 
Record, p. 87, line 30 and p. 88, lines 1 and 2 : 
"The Court: All I am doing, I am trying to 
cut this thing down. It is fine to do these things 
and take all the time you want, but let's keep the 
thing relevant. That is all I am asking. 
"Mr. Christensen: That was her direct ex-
amination, complaining about it, and I am just 
following through. 
''The Court : Go ahead.'' 
Record, p. 93, lines 17 to 30, inc. (It was about 
noon with about two hours of trial having been 
used.) 
''The Court : I am going to ask you how much 
longer you are going to be first. 
"Mr. Christensen: I think I am through with 
this now, and I will reserve the right to ask ques-
tions when we return. 
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''The Court : How long are you going to take 
with the defendant~ 
"Mr. Christensen: About as long as with her. 
"The Court: Let's come back at one o'clock 
and see if we can't finish .... I am not trying to 
tell you how to try your case. I am just trying to 
cut down a little time.'' 
Record, p. 101, lines 23 and 24: 
''The Court: Let him go ahead, Mr. Warnock. 
I think we will save time.'' (All italics are 
writer's) 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence 
the court and plaintiff's counsel had their papers and 
effects together and were in the act of leaving when de-
fendant's counsel inquired as to summation argument, to 
which the court answered that it didn't want or need 
any. (R. 148) The whole trend of the trial was a "rush 
act'' on the part of the judge and plaintiff's counsel, 
particularly after the direct testimony of plaintiff. An 
atmosphere of nothing else matters why prolong it pre-
vailed. As a matter of fact, the trial consumed less than 
four hours. The defendant's contention that the court 
was prejudiced is emphasized further by the court in its 
statements, to-wit: 
''The Court: She said she was unhappy there. 
That is tlll~ only thing I care about.'' (R. 59, line 
30 and 60, line 1) 
The court's attitude was one of allowing anything that 
showed plaintiff was unhappy and nothing to show the 
cause of unhappiness if any existed and whether or not it 
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was merely a concoction in the plaintiff's mind and 
whether or not defendant had anything to do with her 
being unhappy. That defendant had nothing to do with 
any real or fancied unhappiness of plaintiff or whether he 
was doing his best to make a success of the marriage and 
to make his family happy seemed to be of no concern in 
the thoughts and attitude of the court and it manifested 
an attitude of disregard and indifference toward the 
defendant's side of the case. It is little wonder that the 
court's attitude during the trial, coupled with the other 
occurrences set out in the affidavits accompanying the 
Motion for a New Trial caused these lay persons to feel 
that the defendant was not receiving a fair and impartial 
trial. 
Near the conclusion of testimony the court ''jumped'' 
at a conclusion and argued with defendant as follows: 
Record, p. 141, lines 24 to 30 inc. and p. 142. 
By _Mr. Christensen: 
'' Q. Mr. Graziano, you heard your wife tes-
tify. On or about the 1st of March 1955 where 
were you? 
"Mr. Warnock: Well, if the Court please, I 
object to this as being improper redirect. 
''The Court: It is. 
"~Ir. Christensen: He (meaning plaintiff's 
counsel) came up with this in this last and 
said, your Honor, that he married her know-
ing all this. X ow I am going to show the situation 
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''The Court: The situation for what : Why he 
married her~ 
''Mr. Christensen: Yes. 
''The Court : Oh no, we are not going into 
' . . that. They got married and they go this child, and 
I am not going to let anything in this world - I 
don't care who it is, and if it is going to the Su-
phere Court it will have to -but there is not going 
to be anything in this record that is going to 
reflect on this child. I don't care a darn about 
these parties." (Italics writer's) 
(It is interesting to note here that the court, when 
plaintiff was on the stand, did not stop any reflection on 
child due to her statements and her untruthful pleadings.) 
''Mr. Christensen: I didn't say about this 
child. 
''The Court : That is what you are not going 
to get into. 
''Mr. Christensen: I am going to show the de-
fendant did the honorable thing and married her. 
"The Court: That is what I am talking about, 
you are not going to do. 
'' l\Ir. Christensen: He would explain he would 
have married her despite her telling some of these 
cases before the marriage. 
''The Court : He already volunteered that 
statement himself. 
''Mr. Christensen: What Y 
''The Court=. Ex_actly what you just said. He 
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"The Witness: (Mr. Graziano) When did I 
say that~ 
"The Court: You just got through saying it 
a minute go. It is in the record. 
''The Witness: Would you read it for me, 
please~ 
"The Court: You are not going to read it. 
It is already said. Leave this child alone. 
"Mr. Christensen: I am not talking about the 
child. I am talking about the plaintiff and the de-
fenedant. May I proceed~ 
''The Court : As long as you lay off that stuff 
it is all right. Go ahead. 
"Mr. Christensen: He (meaning plaintiff's 
counsel) opened that up. 
"The Court: He has already said, Mr. Chris-
tensen, that he wouldn't have married her if he 
hadn't been on the spot, or words to that effect. He 
has already said. I don't know what more you 
want about this. 
"Mr. Christensen: All I want to know, when 
he returned - that he can testify when he re-
turned from Reno on the job of taking moving pic-
tures, she requested that he marry her, and he 
suggested that she go down and talk to her mother. 
She came back and then he agreed to marry her. 
"The Court: Well, that is your proffer of 
proof, and you can put it in the record. 
"Mr. Christensen: Can't he testify to that 
after they bring up this matter~ 
"The Ce>urt: No, sir. You have made your 
proffer and it is in the record. 
'' nir. Christensen: Miss Reporter, let the rec-
ord show that counsel was refused an opportunity 
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to explain the matter brought up by counsel .for 
plaintiff relative to the occurrence at the time 
the defendant made arrangements for the mar-
riage with the plaintiff on or about the 1st of 
March 1955 and counsel for defendant saves all 
' exceptions relative thereto.'' 
It is submitted that the court surely indicated a 
pre-judging and pre-determination thereon. And on the 
subject of argument between the judge and defendant 
witness the court would not allow the defendant through 
his counsel to further question defendant to explain his 
statement, "That he had no alternative" but to marry 
plaintiff in answer to the question of Plaintiff's counsel. 
The judge assumed only one interpretation and that is 
his own, ''He said he was on the spot and that is all there 
is to it." Defendant -wanted to explain that he did not 
marry plain tiff because he was ''on the spot'' as the judge 
said, but because under his, the defendant's, moral and 
Christian rearing and sense of right and wrong it was 
the honorable thing to do and the right action to take 
under the circumstances, and that he had a love for and 
care for the plaintiff at the time of and after his marriage. 
Also defendant could testify that he refused plaintiff's 
suggestion at the time to have an illegal operation. But 
the court adamantly refused his pretext of "'hurt the 
child'' thought that he was obsessed of during the entire 
proceedings. In situations of this type one must face the 
realities and if certain features exist they must surface 
to have a just determination. One cannot always cover up 
the unsayory incidents of lwha,·ior as plaintiff and her 
family has been accustomed to doing and as the judge 
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attempted to and did in this case. A fact is a fact and in 
litigation they must surface to arrive at justice to all of 
the· parties concerned. Defendant knew that he could not 
have been forced at the time to marry plaintiff as the 
court would indicate the answer meant. It is submitted 
that the action and attitude of the judge on this point, 
coupled with the other demonstrations of his attitudes 
during the proceedings, definitely shows prejudice and 
pre-determination as is stated in the defendant's affidavit. 
The trial was on December 22, 1956, and at a party 
on the evening of that date the affidavits-uncontested and 
undenied-shows plaintiff's counsel stated, "That son of 
a bitch Graziano, that dirty bastard, we'll fix him!" Now 
who is the "we"? Let us connect that with the affidavit 
of ~Iiss Joann Fallentine that at a lodge in Brighton, 
Utah, on the evening of December 28, 1956, the date the 
judge made his decision, the son of plaintiff's counsel 
stated that the judge talked with his dad and congratu-
lated him on handling the case, etc. Now fitting the re-
marks in the affidavits of Mr. Gurhol and Miss Fallentine 
together it is a reasonable conclusion that the "WE" is 
the judge [~nd the plaintiff's counsel. At any event, the 
two affidavits came to defendant's attention and he and 
Mr. Gurholt, both of whom were present during the entire 
trial and heard and saw it all, felt that the judge had not 
been fair and impartial and had pre-determined the 
matter. Defendant brought the foregoing facts to his 
counsel and requested that he do something about it. Of 
course, counsel was aware of all but the contents of the 
affidavits and as defendant counsel feels much the same 
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about the men's conclusions, defendant's counsel, upon 
the insistance of defendant, prepared the affidavits based 
entirely upon affiant's statements and prepared the Mo-
tion for a New Trial and argued it at the hearing. 
Defendant's counsel at the hearing of the Motion for 
a New Trial, when the judge and plaintiff's counsel were 
anxiously making statements, not under oath and being 
made a part of the record, of denial of parts contained 
in the affidavits, were advised by defendant's counsel that 
the rules of procedure provide that the proper method is 
to file opposing affidavits within ten days of service of 
the Motion. The judge indicated that he didn't have 
to or need to make affidavit or statement under oath. 
(R. 158) 
Defendant's counsel advised the court that the rules 
were made to cover just such cases as this and he and 
plaintiff's counsel were being charged with unfairness 
and partiality. (R. 152, lines 10, 11, and 12) To defend-
ant's counsel's reference to the Rule 59 (c) for filing op-
posing affidavits plaintiff's counsel said, "I won't :file 
anything." (R. 158, line 9) Both the judge and plain-
tiff's counsel were disturbed mostly about the charge of 
discussing the matter in chambers and pre-determina-
tion and their statements not under oath and for the 
record were to denying these features of the charges only. 
Of course, these features are somewhat circumstantial 
but the foregoing facts and the actions of the judge and 
plaintiff's counsel all through the proceedings prove de-
fendant's contention thereon, it is submitted. There is 
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no attempt by the judge or plaintiff's counsel to deny any 
of the statements otherwise contained in any of the three 
affidavits and that is understandable as they are a matter 
of the record and any parts thereof not a part of the 
record, if any, are not denied. Plaintiff's counsel falls 
back on ltis legal and social graces or errors to cover his 
actions mentioned in :Mr. Gurholt 's affidavit, and he man-
ufactures a warped version of his son's statements to 
cover that slip or occurrence, but he does not make any 
attempt to deny the contents of Miss Fallen tine's 
affidavit and he refused to file any opposing affidavits. 
Rule of Ci vii Procedure of Utah 59 (c) reads : 
"Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the ap-
plication for a new trial is made under subdivis-
ions (1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by 
affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is 
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after 
such service within which to serve opposing affi-
davits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be ex-
tended for an additional period not exceeding 20 
days either by the court for good cause shown or 
by the parties by written stipulation. The court 
may permit reply affidavits.'' 
It is submitted that the court and plaintiff's counsel 
were cognizant of the rule and it is submitted further 
that being officers of the court, under charge, and in 
charge of the hearing, the rule should be doubly applicable 
to them. 
A comparison of the evidence in its entirety and 
the Findings of Fact filed in the matter clearly indicated 
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and corroborates defendant's contention that the matter 
was pre-determined. The Findings of Fact are clearly 
one-sided and not in conformity with the facts adduced 
in evidence. A reading of the Findings of Fact would 
leave one to wonder whether plaintiff's action was even 
contested. It is submitted that a comparison of the Find-
ings of Fact proposed by defendant and accompanying 
his Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact and the evi-
dence are in conformity. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that defend-
ant did not receive a fair and impartial trial and that the 
evidence does not support the Findings of Fact filed in 
the matter. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW 
APPELLANT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE RELAT-
ING TO: 
(A) WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S MOTHER MADE 
STATEMENTS TO PLAINTIFF DEGRADING 
DEFENDANT IN HIS OCCUPATION, AND 
(B) APPELLANT'S EXPLANATION OF HIS AN-
SWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S QUES-
TION AS TO HIS REASON FOR HIS MARRIAGE 
AS AN HONORABLE AND PROPER ACT 
UNDER HIS CHRISTIAN AND MORAL CODE. 
As to the (A) part of Point 3, I refer to the Record, 
p. 79, lines 24 to 29 inc., which is as follows : 
''The Court: Did You tell the defendant that 
your mother told you "that being a chef was de-
grading? 
"The Witness (Mrs. Graziano): I could have. 
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"Q (By Mr. Christensen): And did your 
mother tell you that 1 
"Mr. Warnock: I object to that. 
''The Court : Objection sustained.'' 
It is submitted that plaintiff was the one who was 
talking to her mother and plaintiff (the witness) knew 
whether it was said to her or not by the person with whom 
she was speaking. It is certainly not hearsay and it is 
relevant in that the defendant pleaded in his counter-
claim that plaintiff's mother interfered by telling plain-
tiff defendant's occupation was degrading. In fact, de-
fendant in his counter-claim specifically pleaded the in-
terference and in the reply plaintiff denied it. The evi-
dence is proper to prove the allegation. 
As to part (B) of Point 3, it is quite fully set out by 
extracts from the Record under Point 2, at pages 41 to 44, 
supra, and is made a part hereof by reference. It is sub-
mitted that when plaintiff's attorney opened up the sub-
ject on his cross-examination of defendant and obtained 
an answer on the new subject it is proper re-direct ex-
amination to allow the defendant an opportunity to 
explain the answer by question and answer from his coun-
sel. It is submitted, however, that the court's main rea-
son for not allowing the further examination was his 
stated ''hurt the child'' contention and not the reason 
assigned by plaintiff's counsel that it was improper re-
direct examination. 
It is therefore submitted without further argument 
that the court erred in not allowing the introducing the 
evidence mentioned in Point 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
Counsel for Appellant respectfully submits that 
plaintiff failed to prove any ground for divorce; that de-
fendant proved sufficient grounds for divorce and that 
defendant should have and should be awarded a divorce; 
that the best interests of the child will be served by 
awarding the custody to the defendant or at least tore-
move the child from the environmental influences of 
plaintiff and plaintiff's family; and that the lower court 
erred in denying defendant's Motion to Amend the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amend 
the Decree. 
It is further respectfully submitted that the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not in conform-
ity with the evidence; that defendant did not receive a 
fair and impartial trial; and that the lower court erred 
in denying defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
It is further respectfully submitted that the lower 
court erred in denying the introduction of the evidence 
as set out under Point 3 hereof. 
Therefore, Counsel for Appellant respectfully sub-
mits that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree should be reversed and the matter found as set 
out in defendant's Motion for Amendments or a new trial 
granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wl\L J. CHRISTENSEN 
.Attorn-ey for Appellant 
1213 Windsor Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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